Water utilities can prepare for water distribution hazards, such as the presence of contaminants in the pipe network and failure of physical components. In contamination events, the complex interactions among managers' operational decisions, consumers' water consumption choices, and the hydraulics and contaminant transport in the water distribution system may influence the contaminant plume so that a typical engineering model may not properly predict public health consequences. A complex adaptive system (CAS) approach couples engineering models of a water distribution system with agent-based models of consumers and public officials. Development of threat management strategies, which prescribe a set of actions to mitigate public health consequences, is enabled through a simulation-optimization framework that couples evolutionary algorithms with the CAS model. Evolution strategies and genetic algorithm-based approaches are developed and compared for an illustrative case study to identify a flushing strategy for opening hydrants to minimize the number of exposed consumers and maintain acceptable levels of service in the network.
INTRODUCTION
Water distribution infrastructure systems are vulnerable to the threat of both intentional and accidental hazards that may introduce a foreign contaminant to the system and expose segments of the population to severe health threats (Geldreich ). Through a loss of pressure in the network, for example, bacteriological pathogens may migrate into pipes (Hrudey & Hrudey ) ; alternatively, chemical toxins may be introduced intentionally at treatment plants and accessible pipes (Kroll ) . Identification and management of threats to water distribution security involve many critical steps to effectively protect public health. For example, vulnerability analysis identifies critical locations in the system where the introduction of contaminants would have harmful consequences for public health, and this information can be used to develop plans for infrastructure hardening and protection (Perelman & Ostfeld ) . Early warning systems place sensors within the network for quick detection of unusual water quality conditions, and these systems can be effectively designed through modeling and optimization methodologies (see Hart & Murray () for a review).
Event detection methods are developed to analyze sensor data to determine if fluctuations in water quality should be attributed to normal system operations or a breach in security. Source characterization methodologies use sensor data in a simulation À optimization framework to identify the con-through flushing. By opening hydrants, water can be expelled from the system until the contaminant is no longer detected in the system. If the area that is impacted is extensive, multiple hydrants may be opened in succession, moving from the source of the contamination in the downstream direction (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ; Irby ). This approach was implemented in 1986 for a case in Lacey's Chapel, Alabama, to flush sodium hydroxide (Watts ), and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency () has described 12 backflow incidents in which contamination was introduced to the drinking water system, and hydrants were opened for flushing. To prepare a utility for these incidents in the future, a number of researchers have developed approaches to plan response actions that would utilize source characterization information and identify hydrants and valves that should be manipulated (Jeong & Identifying strategies for opening hydrants relies largely on water distribution system simulation, and typical simulation and computing analysis regards consumer demands as exogenous variables. Contamination of a water distribution network, however, is a dynamic event during which consumer behaviors and demands may fluctuate. Feedback occurs between the pipe network and a set of agents, including consumers, the media, public health providers, and water utility managers. Each actor receives information from other actors, takes actions that may directly or indirectly affect the hydraulics of the water distribution network, and passes information to other parties. The emergent state of public health is the result of a set of complex adaptive interactions, and the predictability of response strategy performance may be complicated by the adaptive reduction of residential demands. The changes in hydraulic conditions due to the reduction of residential demands alters the prediction of public health consequences and can therefore effect the performance of strategies that are designed to reduce consumer exposure. Simulation studies that consider infrastructure in isolation and do not represent dynamic interactions may not predict the emergent condition of the system.
To fully and realistically assess water distribution system contamination, a complex adaptive system (CAS) (Holland ; Miller & Page ) approach provides an adaptive, dynamic simulation to model the actions and reactions of the actors during a hazardous event. A CAS approach was developed to simulate water distribution system contamination events and was demonstrated for a small virtual city (Zechman ) and a mid-sized virtual city (Shafiee & Zechman ) . These cases demonstrated that considering the changes in consumer demands alters the predicted location and strength of the contaminant plume, compared with hydraulic calculations alone. Simulations showed that as a result of consumers who change their water use after becoming sick, higher amounts of contaminant remain in the system and expose more consumers to a critical level.
The word-of-mouth and communication mechanisms prevent unexposed consumers from becoming ill, and consumers change their demands earlier than if they had not received any warning. The total reduction in demands influence hydraulics, where flow volumes and directions were changed significantly from expected values for a set of contamination events.
Because consumer behaviors can have an influence on the propagation of the contaminant plume, this research presents a simulation-optimization approach that couples a CAS model with evolutionary computation (Holland ) optimization methodologies to develop a methodology for identifying optimal threat management plans while allowing for the adaptations in consumer behaviors. A set of hydrants is scheduled to be opened in the network once the contaminant is released to best protect public health and to maintain a minimum pressure in the network using a specialized evolution strategies (ES)-based approach. The ES-based approach was developed for applications in water distribution systems analysis (Zechman & Ranjithan ) , and in this work it is further extended for searching for hydrants locations and formally compared with existing genetic algorithm (GA) approaches. The use of this framework is demonstrated for a small virtual city, which provides a realistic case study.
AGENT-BASED MODELING OF A WATER DISTRIBUTION CONTAMINATION EVENT
When a contaminant is introduced to a water distribution pipe network, the location of the contaminant plume and the consequences to public health in the network are influenced by the actions and interactions among many key players. The contaminant and the state of public health recursively affect the reactions and responses of the actors in the system, creating dynamic feedback loops among the network and the actors. For example, utility managers may first be alerted to the presence of a real or perceived threat by water quality sensors in the pipe network, public health services, the media, or consumer complaints. For plausible threats, a utility manager may alter network hydraulics by isolating portions of the system and controlling flows in the network, influencing the movement of the plume. Consumers are made aware of contaminated water through media, word-of-mouth communication from other consumers, and as they experience symptoms due to exposure.
Consumers may choose to comply with boil water orders, continue limited water use, or use bottled water, and as a result, the volume of water use may fluctuate significantly from normal demand patterns. Hydraulic conditions are driven by consumer demands, and the spread of the contaminant plume dynamically changes with varying demands. The shift in the contaminant plume may warrant reconsideration of management decisions that were developed using expected demands and flows in the network.
The dynamic nature of the event may be heightened as the event progresses; public health notifications may become available which influence consumer demands, and additional water quality sampling data may be acquired to update and improve management decisions.
The CAS approach is a modeling paradigm that simulates interacting actors as a dynamic network of individual actors, and agent-based modeling (ABM) (Axelrod ;
Miller & Page ) is a tool for simulating a CAS. ABM represents individuals as agents that both act autonomously to achieve their own goals and react to the actions of other agents and to environmental conditions through a set of rules. ABM, or individual-based modeling, pieces together the lowest level of subsystems to give rise to a broad view of the emergent system, in contrast to top-down modeling, which is a more traditional approach for engineering systems and uses a stepwise approach to analyze a system by ) is coupled with the EPANET water distribution system model (Rossman ) to enable simulation of a contamination event. The number of consumer agents exposed above the critical dose for a contaminant is evaluated at the end of a simulated time period to represent the public health consequences. Each consumer is represented as an agent and behaves according to a set of attributes and rules, described briefly below.
Mobility
Agents are made mobile as they visit different nodes during a day to represent a population that commutes to work and visits places of business. Modeling mobility is necessary to determine if an individual agent will drink water at a node that receives contaminated water. Each agent is assigned to one residential node and one non-residential node. The maximum number of individual consumers at each node is allocated using population data. For each simulated time step, the number of agents at commercial and restaurant nodes is calculated using information from the water distribution system data. Water demands fluctuate during the day at these non-residential nodes and the population at a node increases and decreases with demands. The number of agents at each node and time step is calculated as the nor- At each time step, agents are chosen with uniform probability to leave their residence node and occupy their nonresidential node. The number of agents at non-residential nodes increases through the morning, reaches a peak in the early afternoon, and decreases to zero into the evening.
As the number of agents at a non-residential node decreases, agents are released and return to their assigned residential node.
Water consumption
Models for the timing and volume of consumed water are needed to calculate the exposure of an individual agent.
Agents drink water at different times of a day, and similarly, the level of contaminant in the water at a node varies with the movement of the contaminant plume. Davis & Janke () developed an ingestion timing model, which specifies the times at which consumers ingest tap water. The timing model specifies that a consumer ingests tap water at three times per day, corresponding to meals, and each consumer also ingests tap water midway between meals. For each agent, the timings of the five daily ingestions are generated probabilistically using a set of distributions, which are based on U.S. census data that describe statistical information about time use (Davis & Janke ) . The total volume of water that each consumer ingests per day is also generated using a probabilistic distribution, as developed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (), with an expected value of 0.92 L. The total volume of water that is consumed by each agent is divided evenly among the five daily ingestions.
Exposure and demand reduction
The exposure of each agent is calculated based on his ingestion of contaminated water. For any contaminant, a critical dose describes the amount of contaminant that an individual should ingest to experience symptoms. Once an agent ingests a cumulative critical dose of the contaminant the agent is flagged as 'exposed'. Exposed agents reduce their consumption for contact uses, but are modeled to maintain a moderate level of demand, representing toilets, pipe leakage and outdoor water use. A consumer's residential node is specified as multi-family housing or single-family housing, and consumers that reside in multi-family housing will reduce their demand to 43% of normal uses, and consumers that reside in single-family housing, to 60% (Vickers ).
Word-of-mouth communication
A consumer who becomes exposed to a contaminant through drinking tap water will warn other consumers, who are expected to reduce their water usage and notify other consumers. An agent who changes his water use due to exposure or a warning message from peers responds by alerting a set of connected consumers 1 hour after changing his water usage. If the agent resides at a single-family residence, he will contact all agents located at his residence, representing family members. If the agent resides at a multi-family residence, he will contact one neighbor located at the same node. Consumers that are located at non-residential nodes (representing commercial or industrial nodes) at the time they change their water use, will contact one consumer at the same node, along with consumers at their residential nodes.
Consumers that receive an alert from other consumers will react probabilistically. If a consumer receives a message from a family member, the notified agent certainly stops using water for contact purposes. If the consumer receives the message from an associate at a non-residential node (work colleague) or a neighbor at a multi-family housing unit, the notified consumer will change his water usage with a probability of 75%.
PROBLEM STATEMENT FOR IDENTIFYING HYDRANT STRATEGIES
While a dynamic modeling framework provides simulation of contamination scenarios to evaluate the probabilistic out- Alfonso et al. ). Because this framework uses an ABM approach, the number of exposed consumers can be minimized directly. A hydrant strategy, which specifies the location of hydrants and the timing for opening and closing hydrants, is identified to best protect consumers from exposure. The model formulation is as follows:
The objective of the optimization model is to minimize C e , which is the number of consumers exposed above the critical dose. The number of exposed consumers is calculated using the ABM simulation framework and is a function of the decision vectors, including the identification of a set of hydrants that should be opened to flush the system (2)) is added to the objective function to enforce that the minimum pressure remains above an allowable pressure. Penalty is a coefficient for the violation, and is set equal to five for this study.
This research develops a simulation-optimization approach to identify effective response plans which are selected from a large set of potential solutions. Highly fit solutions are selected through a framework that couples agent-based and water distribution models with a heuristic optimization methodology ( Figure 1 ). Sets of solutions are generated by the optimization methodology, and each solution specifies a hydrant strategy, or a vector of locations, times, and durations for opening hydrants (e.g., h, t d , and t s ). To evaluate a solution, these values are encoded in the input data for the water distribution model as a set of additional demands at hydrant nodes, with beginning and start times for the additional demand as specified by that solution. The ABM is executed for each hydrant strategy to (Equation (2) ), and the number of exposed consumers is tallied to represent the objective function.
These data are passed to the optimization algorithm, which assigns a fitness value to the solution. Each solution that is generated by the optimization algorithm is evaluated using this approach. The optimization algorithm evaluates a large set of solutions (a population), and over many iterations, improves the solution vectors to converge the population of solutions to a nearly-optimal set of values.
Optimization approaches developed in previous work ithms. An ES-based approach that was developed for directing a search among nodes in a water distribution network is described, further developed, and compared with existing GA approaches here.
Genetic algorithm
The GA ( 
Mutation
To mutate the value of a gene, a normal distribution is sampled to generate a new random value. The current value of the gene serves as the mean of the distribution, and the standard deviation of the distribution is determined adaptively. Using an adaptive mutation operator (Schwefel ), the standard deviation is specified as an additional gene for each decision variable and is mutated with the other genes in the solution. Therefore, two genes are required to represent any decision variable: the first gene represents the value of the variable, x i , and the second gene represents the standard deviation, σ xi , that is used to mutate x i . At each generation, when a solution is selected for mutation, σ xi is mutated, and then used as the standard deviation to mutate x i . As the fitness of an individual improves, it will be reproduced more, and many of its offspring will be generated with small standard deviation values, which ensure that smaller steps will be taken in the decision space as the population converges. 
Selection
In a typical ES, the selection operator is deterministic, ensuring that one copy of each of the best μ solutions in a new population survive to the next generation. The elitist graduated overselection strategy (Fernandez & Evett ) allows quicker convergence than a deterministic selection.
To execute elitist overgraduate selection, the parent (μ) and children ( 
MICROPOLIS: A SMALL VIRTUAL CITY
Micropolis is a virtual city that is used to demonstrate the optimization of response actions using the CAS framework (Brumbelow et al. ) . The water distribution system is comprised of 575 water mains, 52 hydrants, eight pumps, two reservoirs, and one tank (Figure 2 ). Demands are exerted at 1,236 residential, industrial, and commercial/ institutional nodes, representing a small community of 5,232 residents. Each resident is simulated as an agent.
Agents ingest water, become exposed, change drinking patterns, communicate with other agents, and move between residential and non-residential nodes as described above during the simulation. Consumers are assigned characteristics as shown in Table 1 .
Contaminant event simulation
A contaminant is introduced at the water tank, which is located in the central section of the city (Figure 2 ). The contaminant is simulated as conservative, and a dose of 9,000 kg is injected over a 6-hour period, beginning at 12 a.m. The event is simulated for a period of 48 hours after the contaminant is injected.
The contamination event is first simulated without any mitigation actions. To account for stochasticity in the simulation, the event is simulated 30 times, and the range of exposure for three cases is shown in Figure 3 . The event is simulated without protective actions (reduction in demands) and without word-of-mouth, and the average number of exposed consumers over 30 simulations is 2,484. The same event is modeled with protective actions of the consumers, but without word-of-mouth. The number of exposed consumers increases to an average of 3,128, as those consumers who are exposed stop drinking, leaving more contaminant in the system. In this case, exposed consumers do not warn others, so that un-exposed consumers continue to drink and gradually consume enough contaminant to become exposed. Finally, by including all behaviors of the consumers, exposure is reduced due to the word-of-mouth mechanism, and the average number of exposed consumers over 30 simulations of the event is 2,694. The propagation of Due to the probabilistic nature of the ABM of consumer behavior, there is stochasticity in the performance of any one solution. In preliminary studies (Zechman ), a noisy optimization approach was tested, where each solution is evaluated for ten realizations, and the fitness is calculated as the average of the realizations. This approach increases the computational burden and does not result in solutions with more robust performance. Therefore, each solution is evaluated within the optimization process in the present formulation for only one realization. Once the algorithm has terminated, the best solution in the population is post-processed and is evaluated for thirty realizations. The average of the thirty realizations is defined as the fitness of the best solution, and the average fitness across the 10 best solutions generated through 10 trials is reported for each algorithm (Figure 4) . The solutions identified by ES are able to reduce the number of exposed consumers lower than those solutions identified by the GA, using either uniform or arithmetic crossover. Using the elitist graduated overselection reduces the average fitness further. Based on hypothesis tests (Milton & Arnold ) , uniform crossover finds a better-performing solution than arithmetic crossover with a 99% confidence interval; ES using deterministic selection performs better than GA using uniform crossover with a 99% confidence interval; and elitist graduate overselection performs better than deterministic selection with a 98% confidence interval. Although this extra selection pressure runs the risk of premature convergence, it is able to focus the search in areas of good solutions.
Delays in response planning
Ideally, a utility operator should respond as quickly as possible to flush contaminants through opening hydrants. It is expected, however, that there would be a delay in the response, and a utility operator may not have enough information to respond immediately. Additional response plans are identified here for utility managers who respond after some delay. Four settings are simulated, where hydrants are opened after 3:00, 5:00, 7:00, and 9:00 a.m. For each setting, the ES with overselection was executed for five random trials.
As the contaminant is not controlled as early, the number of exposed consumers increases with the increased delays in response ( Figure 6 ). The best solution found for each setting is shown in Figure 7 , with details for the time and location for opening and closing each hydrant. For the 1:00, 3:00, and 5:00 a.m. scenarios, each solution in the set (10 solutions for 1:00 a.m. and five solutions for 3:00 and 5:00 a.m.) had one hydrant in common (shown in bold in Figure 7) . The common hydrant is, however, not the same for the different delay scenarios. In general, hydrant strategies specify that centrally located hydrants should be opened for early responses; as the delay in response increases and the contaminant moves through the system, the hydrants that should be opened are located further from the source.
As shown in Figure 6 , the variability in the performance of the set of solutions decreases with increasing delays.
For hydrant strategies that can be executed quickly, there may be many potential combinations of hydrants that could be opened, while for more delayed hydrant strategies, the number of consumers that can be protected is limited, and only a few strategies exist.
Sensitivity analysis was conducted to determine the sensitivity of a solution to the number of hydrants that should be opened by ranking the hydrants based on their contribution to the number of consumers protected (Figure 8 ).
For the best solution for a 1:00 a.m. response time, each of the five hydrants was simulated alone to determine the most effective hydrant. Each hydrant was simulated for 30 realizations, and the average performance is reported as the fitness. To determine the second most effective hydrant, each of the remaining four hydrants was tested in combination with the first most effective hydrant for 30 realizations, and so forth. This analysis was repeated for the best solutions corresponding to 3:00, 5:00, 7:00, and 9:00 a.m. strategies. For the 1:00, 3:00, and 5:00 a.m. strategies, Hydrants 1-4 have added value in protecting more consumers. For the 7:00 a.m. strategy, Hydrants 1-3 add value to the solution, and for the 9:00 a.m. strategy, only
Hydrants 1 and 2 are effective. These results are compared with the average number of consumers exposed when no hydrants are opened (2,694 exposed consumers). As shown by the 9:00 a.m. strategy, as a utility responds later to an event, actions are less effective, and only two hydrants are utilized in protecting the greatest number of consumers.
In addition, it does not appear that more than five hydrants can be utilized for the early response strategies, regardless of the speed of response. In this problem formulation, a
hydrant can remain open for 10 hours at most; this setting could be explored to allow a hydrant to remain open for a longer time to increase the number of protected consumers. the range in the number of exposed consumers across five random trials. choices. The CAS model provides a count of the number of exposed consumers and is coupled with evolutionary algorithm-based approaches to minimize public health consequences by specifying hydrants that should be opened to flush contaminants from the system. The purpose of this framework is to assist utility managers in developing response plans for use in the event of contamination. As expected, longer delays in response decrease protection of public health, and when actions are taken later in the event, a smaller number of hydrants can be effectively utilized to reduce the number of exposed consumers.
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
Two evolutionary computation-based approaches were tested here for identifying hydrant strategies. An ES-based approach with a specialized mutation operator designed for network-based problem domains was demonstrated to perform significantly better than two conventional GAbased approaches. While the network mutation operator has been demonstrated and applied in previous works, here it is further developed for identifying hydrants, rather than intermediate nodes, and is formally compared with a GA-based approach. The ES-based search has many other applications in solving water distribution design and management problems, along with potential for application in other network-based domains.
For the case study examined here, there are several combinations of hydrants that could be opened to result in the same number of protected consumers. At the same time, many hydrant combinations could increase the number of exposed consumers beyond the number of consumers who would be exposed without any response strategies. For example, the GA with arithmetic crossover identifies strategies that expose more than 3,000 consumers ( Figure 5 , upper left), compared with an average of 2,694 consumers who are exposed when the utility manager does not take any response action at all. It is critical, therefore, to design a strategy for opening hydrants that will not expose additional consumers, but maximize public health protection. Due to the complexities of hydraulic flows in a water distribution system and the changing hydraulics caused by consumer actions, a formal optimization algorithm is needed and is demonstrated here to identify the most effective hydrant strategies.
On-going research is investigating development and application of the coupled ABM-evolutionary computation framework to manage threats for a larger, more realistic municipality (Shafiee & Zechman a, b, ; Zechman et al. ). The framework described here demonstrates a new approach that can be taken to assist utility operators in responding to hazardous events. Further methodological development and faster computational implementations can be developed to enable an ABM-optimization framework for application in a real-time approach to find optimal response plans once a contaminant source has been identified. A more accurate approach for modeling hydrants uses a pressure-driven approach, and on-going work is modifying the simulation to include pressuredriven simulation for new case studies, building on the flexible methodology and framework that is developed here.
The results identified here are specific to this contamination event; events of larger doses or longer durations may require more hydrants for mitigation. To develop an understanding of how to proceed in a hazardous event without immediate identification of a contaminant source, a library of response actions can be developed by optimizing response plans a priori for a large set of contaminant event scenarios.
Future work will couple the framework described here with additional methodologies to develop a more comprehensive threat management planning toolkit.
